The UK and EU are ignoring Swaziland’s threats to
human rights and civic space, refusing to hold the monarchy to account.
Swaziland held national elections on 21 September,
but they were nothing more than a charade. As a recent study by
journalist and former associate professor at the University of Swaziland,
Richard Rooney, asserted before the election: “We can already name the
winner—it will be the absolute monarch King Mswati III”, writes
Sunit Bagree.
In Swaziland, political parties are banned from
taking part in elections. The People’s United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO),
widely recognised as the country’s largest opposition party, is proscribed
under anti-terrorism legislation. Mswati III has huge influence over elections
to the House of Assembly through his network of local chiefs, and the king
directly appoints two-thirds of the Senate. Mswati III also appoints the prime
minister and cabinet, as well as senior judges and civil servants. The king can
veto legislation and criticising the monarch is against the law.
In addition to this lack of any political
competition, Swazi political activists and human rights defenders regularly
endure harassment, threats and violence. For example, meetings of the Trade
Union Congress of Swaziland (TUCOSWA) were disrupted in February and March, and
peaceful demonstrations organised by TUCOSWA were brutally suppressed by state
security forces in April and June. The
situation has become so bleak that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation Index of African
Governance places
Swaziland 50th out of 54 countries for “participation and human
rights”. Women in
particular suffer from marginalisation and human rights violations.
In addition to repression of civil society space,
inequality in Swaziland is alarmingly high. The gap between the royal family
and the tiny elite around them on the one hand, and the vast majority of Swazis
on the other, was brought to light last year when research by the
Brookings Institution named Swaziland the most unequal country in the world in
terms of income distribution. For example, Swaziland’s political system has
allowed Mswati III to amass a personal fortune estimated to be as much as $200
million. This, along with the enormous annual royal budget
(extracted from the public purse), enables his eye-watering expenditure on
luxuries ranging from a suit studded with diamonds to private jets. Meanwhile 63% of Swazis
live below the poverty line. On top of this, the country has the world’s highest adult HIV
prevalence and over 15% of
citizens require food assistance in the lean season.
Despite these failings and the resulting risks to
the majority of Swazis, the response by the international community has been
incredibly weak. Swaziland is small, but its people are as deserving of a
legitimate, inclusive and effective government as people in any other part of
the world. And there are moral, legal and practical reasons for more action
from the EU and UK in particular. First, the UK governed Swaziland until the
country became independent in 1968, which occurred only after the British government
conceded to massive public pressure for political change. Thus, the UK’s legacy
and influence in the Swazi government is still relatively recent, and arguably
the UK holds some responsibility for the current state of affairs. Second, the
EU is legally bound to act through the Cotonou
Agreement, which calls for increased engagement between the
EU and 79 African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) countries, including provisions on
human rights and democracy. If Swaziland continues on its downward spiral, then
the costs to the region and beyond could be significant. The pragmatic approach
is to act now.
Yet both the UK government and the EU have failed
to meaningfully challenge Swaziland’s absolute monarch. At best, their
criticisms of the King’s regime have been muted. On occasion, they have even
given the appearance of endorsing the King’s autocratic rule. For example, in
the UK, Mswati III was invited to the wedding of Prince William and Kate Middleton in 2011 and
the Queen’s diamond jubilee celebratory
lunch in 2012. As for the EU, its current Ambassador to
Swaziland, Esmeralda Hernandez Aragones, has praised the
king’s “wise and strong leadership”.
British and EU officials make three excuses when
civil society actors in Swaziland and in Europe object to their approach.
First, they say that European actors need to be wary of looking like they are
acting in a neo-imperial manner, especially as the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) are reluctant to take action on
Swaziland. Second, they insist that quiet diplomacy is the best way to apply
pressure on the Government of Swaziland. These two arguments are often made in
relation to other African countries, thus they are of wider relevance. Third,
they argue that the Swazi pro-democracy movement is fragmented and this limits
what can be done by external actors. All of these excuses are deeply flawed.
The first excuse is riddled with poor logic. It is
true that neither
SADC nor the AU have taken human rights abuses, autocracy and
corruption in Swaziland seriously. This is due to a combination of
authoritarian governments in Africa protecting each other from criticism and
democratic governments on the continent possessing a misguided fear of
“embarrassing” their peers. Yet this does not mean that the rest of the
world should just follow suit. Instead, the UK and EU should strive to act as a
shining example to SADC and the AU. There is nothing neo-imperial in holding
Swaziland to account for violating its obligations under international law. The
second excuse, championing the quiet diplomacy approach, ignores the fact that
Mswati III has consistently blocked
efforts for genuine political transformation since 1986.
Many Swazis struggling for freedom say that the situation in their country is
worse now than it was a decade ago. The third excuse is merely a complaint.
There are certainly some divisions in the pro-democracy movement in Swaziland.
Yet Swazis have been able to agree on some key demands. Instead
of simply lamenting the lack of unity on the part of pro-democracy forces in
Swaziland, why not help them to be become a more cohesive force for positive
change?
The time for quiet diplomacy has long passed. The
UK and EU should regularly and robustly publicly criticise Mswati III and his
government. The EU should only give aid (the UK does not have a bilateral aid
programme) in a way that does not allow the Swazi state to divert expenditure
away from key sectors, and it should encourage other donors (such as the US and
World Bank) to adopt a similar approach. The EU should also withdraw trade
preferences (and the UK should do the same post-Brexit). In addition, the UK
and EU should call for Swaziland to be subject to international monitoring and
accountability mechanisms, such as the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group
and the Special Procedures of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
All of these measures should continue until the
king commits to genuine political transformation. In the meantime, the UK and
EU should offer greater financial, technical and diplomatic support to those
within the country who are seeking to build a strong and united movement to
transform their society in favour of democracy and human rights.
Sunit
Bagree is Senior Campaigns Officer at Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA), the
successor organisation to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. He is based in the UK.
See also
Chorus
Against Swazi Election Grows
Pressurise
Swaziland To Change
https://swazimedia.blogspot.com/2017/12/pressurise-swaziland-to-change.html
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