The democratisation of
Swaziland: inside or outside job?
Kenworthy
News Media, 12 January 2017
The small
absolute monarchy of Swaziland is best known for its tourism, “unique” culture
tied to its monarchy, and the cultural and spending exploits of playboy-king
Mswati III, not for its repressive regime and ongoing struggle for democracy, writes
Kenworthy News Media.
Swaziland
is nominally a middle-income country that is seldom condemned by world leaders
and rarely mentioned in the international media, even though it is one of the
most unequal, poverty-stricken and unfree countries in the world, and even
though King Mswati spends millions of dollars on prestige projects and personal
jets while his subjects starve.
For this
to change, the democratic movement in Swaziland need to present a common and
credible alternative to the present regime, and together with the international
community start truly pressurising Mswati’s regime.
A modern
feudal state
Swaziland was a British protectorate from 1903 to 1968. The colonization of Swaziland was similar to that of other African nations. Hut taxes, cruel treatment of colonial “subjects” and a traditional structure that was kept more or less in place enabled the colonialists to rule Swaziland on the cheap and the Swazi king and his chiefs to run much of the daily administration while increasing their power.
Swaziland was a British protectorate from 1903 to 1968. The colonization of Swaziland was similar to that of other African nations. Hut taxes, cruel treatment of colonial “subjects” and a traditional structure that was kept more or less in place enabled the colonialists to rule Swaziland on the cheap and the Swazi king and his chiefs to run much of the daily administration while increasing their power.
In 1973,
after elections that saw the opposition NNLC gain three seats in parliament as
opposed to the 21 seats of King Sobhuza’s Imbokodvo National Movement, the king
suspended the constitution, proclaimed a state of emergency, banned political
parties and began ruling by decree.
The
reason given for the dismantling of Swazi democracy was, the King claimed, that
“the constitution has permitted the importation into our country of highly
undesirable political practices alien to and incompatible with the way of life
in our society.”
But even
though elections are still held every five years in Swaziland, Sobhuza’s son
King Mswati III chooses the Prime Minister, the Government and controls
Parliament and the Senate through his chiefs. He also controls the courts,
Swazi national land and the economy and thus rules more or less as a feudal
lord.
Repressed
dissatisfaction
Swaziland might have got a new constitution in 2005, which nominally guarantees Swazis freedom of speech and association. But if anyone dares to question the regime, the Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA) from 2008 (that Amnesty International calls an “inherently repressive act” that defines terrorism in sweeping terms) allows the courts to charge activists with terrorism for trivial matters such as wearing a political t-shirt or shouting a political slogan. Even the Swazi press employ a great deal of self-censorship, especially when reporting about King Mswati.
Swaziland might have got a new constitution in 2005, which nominally guarantees Swazis freedom of speech and association. But if anyone dares to question the regime, the Suppression of Terrorism Act (STA) from 2008 (that Amnesty International calls an “inherently repressive act” that defines terrorism in sweeping terms) allows the courts to charge activists with terrorism for trivial matters such as wearing a political t-shirt or shouting a political slogan. Even the Swazi press employ a great deal of self-censorship, especially when reporting about King Mswati.
The Swazi
democratic movement has fought for democracy since the king started ruling by
decree in 1973. And regardless of the severely decreasing political space since
the passing of the STA (Swaziland is one of the least free countries in the
world in regard to political rights, on par with countries such as Saudi Arabia
and worse than Iraq and Afghanistan, according to independent watchdog
organization Freedom House), and a generation gap in the leadership and
disagreements within the factions of the movement (not least pro-democracy
political parties such as PUDEMO, SWADEPA and the NNLC whose leaders perhaps
disagree more on a strategical and personal level than on a political), a
growing number of Swazis are seemingly dissatisfied with the current political system.
When a
committee visited all Swaziland’s Tinkundla administrative districts in 1991,
Swaziland’s “democracy” was given “an overwhelming vote of no confidence by the
majority of the people who attended the meetings,” according to author,
sociologist and professor at the University of Witwatersrand, Richard Levin.
More
recently, a poll from 2015 by independent research institute Afrobarometer
showed that only a third of the population saw their political system as being
democratic. Another poll from 2016 revealed Swaziland to be one of the
countries of the 36 African countries polled that have seen the biggest
positive change in favour of democracy in the last 5 years.
Knowing
is not acting
Despite an educational system that seems to intentionally use a rigid “banking model” of teaching to keep them docile, where scholarships and land allocation are tied to submissiveness to Mswati’s chiefs, and where a repressive set of values that is sold as “traditional” culture, Swazis are beginning to question Mswati’s absolute rule, and linking their own poverty, misfortune and lack of freedom to Mswati and his regime. This is probably in no small part due to decade-long programmes of civic education in the rural areas.
Despite an educational system that seems to intentionally use a rigid “banking model” of teaching to keep them docile, where scholarships and land allocation are tied to submissiveness to Mswati’s chiefs, and where a repressive set of values that is sold as “traditional” culture, Swazis are beginning to question Mswati’s absolute rule, and linking their own poverty, misfortune and lack of freedom to Mswati and his regime. This is probably in no small part due to decade-long programmes of civic education in the rural areas.
The
problem is, however, that ordinary Swazis, of which over two thirds live in the
rural areas, many as impoverished subsistence farmers, have to think twice
before criticizing the king and acting on this criticism.
They have
to determine whether the democratic movement is strong enough to take the risk
and if the alternative to Mswati’s rule that they represent is realistic or
plausible and worth the risk of being charged with terrorism, tortured by
police, imprisoned or losing one’s land, job, house or even life, as many
activists fighting for democracy in Swaziland have experienced.
Like
William Mkhaliphi, an 82-year-old sugar cane farmer, who has been evicted from
his land and who suddenly faced threats and several charges of theft after he
criticised Mswati to his face at the so-called Sibaya people’s parliament last
year. An event that, according to Swaziland’s constitution, is the “highest
policy and advisory council” in Swaziland and according to the monarch an
important part of what he refers to as “Swazi democracy,” but in effect a
futile royal showcase.
Or
teacher and veteran PUDEMO activist Mphandlana ‘Victim’ Shongwe, who has been
beaten, imprisoned and is still to find employment as a teacher due to his
activism. He is, like many other activists, still officially out on bail and
has had to report to the police station every Friday since 2006.
Or
SWAYOCO President Bheki Dlamini, who was tortured, charged with arson and spent
nearly four years in a tiny cell waiting for a trail that acquitted him. Like
many other Swazi activists, he has subsequently had to flee Swaziland, due to a
speech that he made in 2014.
An
unsustainable state
Even though Swaziland is often seen abroad and by tourists, who only see the well-kept roads, game parks and shopping malls, as a peaceful and stable country, such stability is a mirage.
Even though Swaziland is often seen abroad and by tourists, who only see the well-kept roads, game parks and shopping malls, as a peaceful and stable country, such stability is a mirage.
Many
casual labourers in Swaziland’s sugar industry earn around 5 dollars a day,
unemployment is at 40 percent, a third of the population is undernourished and
two thirds of the population survive on less than a dollar a day – many on food
aid from the UN.
Swaziland
was nearly bankrupt in 2011, where the IMF reported that “the debt dynamic [in
Swaziland] is becoming unsustainable,” and where the government barely managed
to pay the salaries of its over 30.000 civil servants.
Given
that Swaziland has recently lost valuable income from the AGOA trade-deal with
the USA, and could lose other similar sources of income, this could easily
happen again.
Swaziland,
a landlocked and allegedly peaceful country with no external enemies, also
spends more on defence and security than on health, in a country with the
highest HIV/Aids prevalence in the world.
The
silent international community
Neighbouring South Africa is Swaziland most important trading partner with 90 percent of Swaziland’s imports and 60 percent of exports going to and from South Africa. The Swazi currency is also tied to the South African Rand.
Neighbouring South Africa is Swaziland most important trading partner with 90 percent of Swaziland’s imports and 60 percent of exports going to and from South Africa. The Swazi currency is also tied to the South African Rand.
It was a
combination of a (more or less) united South African movement that was
supported by both state and not-state actors outside the country, and a boycott
of South African products, sportsmen et al that helped bring about an economic
implosion of the white regime that led to the downfall of apartheid.
The
problem for Swaziland is that the South African-inspired democratic movement,
non-state organisations around the world, and not least the international
community, are not putting enough pressure on Mswati’s regime or the companies
that help keep it is place. Not least Coca-Cola, whose huge concentration plant
in Swaziland contributes about 40 percent of the country’s GDP.
There are
many reasons for this relative inaction on the part of the international
community, apart from the fact that Swaziland has no real strategic importance
and is a small country with limited buying power.
Neighbouring
South Africa is led by the Mswati-friendly Jacob Zuma, who is married to one of
Mswati’s nieces, and whose party the ANC have investments in Swaziland with
Mswati. Even though South Africa is to a large degree an important key to
democratisation is Swaziland, the country has been conspicuously silent on
Swaziland in recent years, even though the ANC have strong links to PUDEMO and
though ANC-tripartite alliance partners SACP and COSATU and local organisations
are much more vocal and act-prone in regard to Swaziland.
The
Southern African Development Community, which Mswati was appointed chair of in
August, is also more or less silent in regard to democratisation in Swaziland.
And by
supporting Swaziland through its sugar market, the EU and other countries are
in effect propping up Mswati’s regime, although various EU-institutions
criticise Swaziland lack of freedom from time to time. EU-demands in regard to
democratic reforms to keep its important free trade status for sugar to the
EU-market could nevertheless be effective.
In fact
Denmark and the UK are the only two countries who are significantly
pressurising Mswati’s regime, probably in some part due to the fact that
organisations in the two countries (ACTSA and Afrika Kontakt, as well as the
Danish trade union movement and political parties the Red-Green Alliance and
the Social Democrats) have partner projects in Swaziland and are some of the
most vocal in supporting the democratic movement and calling for
democratisation and socio-economic justice.
What can
the international community do?
Because properly pressuring the Swazi regime does actually seem to work, however slow the process might seem to be and however reluctant to actual change Mswati’s regime is, even when pressured.
Because properly pressuring the Swazi regime does actually seem to work, however slow the process might seem to be and however reluctant to actual change Mswati’s regime is, even when pressured.
When the USA
annulled the AGOA free trade agreement with Swaziland in early 2015, because
Swaziland would not agree to American demands in regard to repressive
legislation such as the Suppression of Terrorism Act, workers’ rights and
democratisation, Swaziland started amending its legislation and releasing
political prisoners such as PUDEMO President Mario Masuku.
When the
European Parliament, Amnesty International and journalists and lawyers from
around the world put pressure on the Swazi regime to release human rights
lawyer Thulani Maseko and magazine Editor Bheki Makhubu, they were eventually
released – although only two weeks before they had served their prison terms
for criticising the chief justice.
And when
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), together with solidarity movements
and political parties such as Afrika Kontakt and the Red-Green Alliance,
pressurised Swaziland in regard to the banning of the country’s trade union
confederation TUCOSWA, the ban was eventually lifted in mid-2015.
Part of
the democratic movement, especially PUDEMO, have also suggested that targeted
sanctions that restrict the travelling of key members of the Swazi government
and the royal family is a way of pressurising, ostracising and eroding the
legitimacy of Mswati’s regime that can complement other means of pressure.
Change
must be wholesale
But whatever the international community do, pressure for democratic change and a credible set of alternatives (such as implementable policies on concrete matters such as land-, educational and financial policies) to Mswati’s rule have to come primarily from Swazis themselves – also to show the international community that the Swazi democratic movement is serious about democracy and worth supporting.
But whatever the international community do, pressure for democratic change and a credible set of alternatives (such as implementable policies on concrete matters such as land-, educational and financial policies) to Mswati’s rule have to come primarily from Swazis themselves – also to show the international community that the Swazi democratic movement is serious about democracy and worth supporting.
For such
pressure is cyclical, and starts with the democratic movement in Swaziland,
whose activism in turn can activate partner organisations and others
sympathetic to their cause, who in turn can help pressurise international
governments, companies and the Swazi regime itself.
But any
true, meaningful and successful opposition to a regime such as Mswati’s, and
any true implementation of a democracy after he has acceded to this pressure,
will also have to be a personal, educational and cultural revolution for Swazis
as well as a political one.
Not least
in a country that ranks 155th out of 180 on the World Press Index,
where livelihood and education are linked to cultural submission, and where
trivial statements are seen as acts of terrorism by an Orwellian terror act.
This
paper forms the basis of a presentation given by Peter Kenworthy at the
University of Bergen, Norway, on 12/1-2017.
